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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
No doctor testified at Jason Cort Brock’s trial. But the alleged victim in this domestic
battery—traumatic injury case made two statements about her medical diagnoses, and those
statements were outside the scope of the permitted testimony under the district court’s order on
Mr. Brock’s motion in limine to prevent testimony on medical diagnoses. Following each of the
medical diagnosis statements, the district court gave the jury an instruction to disregard the
statement. After the jury found Mr. Brock guilty, he filed a motion for a new trial, asserting his
trial counsel had intended to request a mistrial and the medical diagnosis statements warranted a
mistrial. The district court denied Mr. Brock’s motion for a new trial.
In this appeal, Mr. Brock asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Around 2:00 AM one morning, Canyon County Sheriff’s Deputy Curl received two calls
for service to the Notus area, believed to be connected. (See Tr., p.64, L.17 – p.65, L.1.)1 The
first call was from a male named Jason, who stated that his wife had punched and pushed him.
(See Tr., p.65, Ls.2-5.) In the second call, the caller stated that a woman had come to the door
and said that Jason had punched her. (See Tr., p.65, Ls.5-8.)
When Deputy Curl responded to the location of the calls near the fire station in Notus,
officers from Parma and Wilder were already there with a man and a woman. (See Tr., p.65,
Ls.11-23.) The man, Mr. Brock, had red marks on his forehead and right knee, and he had
1

All citations to “Tr.” refer to the 278-page volume of the Transcript on Appeal which includes
the transcripts of the Jury Trial conducted on October 24 and 25, 2019, as well as the transcript
of the Motion for New Trial hearing conducted on December 18, 2019.
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swelling on his left hand. (Tr., p.66, Ls.1-17, p.70, L.7 – p.71, L.1.) The woman, Myra Cathy
Brock, had a bloody, red, swollen nose and swelling around her eyes. (See Tr., p.67, Ls.11-21;
Tr., p.85, Ls.13-20.)

After Deputy Curl spoke with Mr. Brock and Ms. Brock, he took

Mr. Brock to the Canyon County Jail, while Ms. Brock was taken to the hospital. (See Tr., p.66,
L.7 – p.70, L.6.)
Ms. Brock was Mr. Brock’s ex-wife, and they had two adult children together. (See
Tr., p.32, L.11 – p.33, L.5, p.129, Ls.3-14.) As of the date of the incident, Ms. Brock had been
living in Mr. Brock’s house in Notus for about six years. (See Tr., p.33, Ls.6-8, p.129, L.20 –
p.130, L.6.) Mr. Brock testified that he had been hoping that they would get back together.
(Tr., p.130, Ls.13-19.)
Before 2:00 am on the morning of the incident, Mr. Brock confronted Ms. Brock about
nude photos she had taken two years prior. (See Tr., p.33, L.9 – p.34, L.7, p.130, L.20 – p.133,
L.7.) The photos were on Ms. Brock’s Facebook Messenger app, and Mr. Brock was able to
access them because Ms. Brock used Facebook Messenger on Mr. Brock’s phone. (See Tr., p.34,
Ls.8-16, p.131, Ls.5-17.) Mr. Brock testified that Ms. Brock had sent the photos to another guy,
and he was upset because he thought that they had more than a roommate relationship at the time
the photos were taken. (See Tr., p.131, L.25 – p.132, L.25.)
Mr. Brock testified that he had taken his prescription Xanax about an hour before
confronting Ms. Brock, which generally made him sleepy within fifteen minutes of taking it.
(See Tr., p.133, L.25 – p.134, L.14.) He had also drunk about half a can of Monaco, a canned
cocktail. (See Tr., p.134, Ls.15-24.)
The two had a verbal argument about the photos, and Ms. Brock told Mr. Brock he had
done nothing for their daughter while she was sick. (See Tr., p.35, Ls.4-8, p.146, Ls.3-22.) The
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verbal argument escalated into a physical altercation. (See Tr., p.34, L.20 – p.35, L.14, p.133,
Ls.10-24.) Mr. Brock testified that the physical altercation began when Ms. Brock slapped him
on both sides of his face. (Tr., p.133, Ls.17-21.) He told her she hit like a bitch, and she slapped
him again and got him with a “haymaker,” a right hook that knocked him out over a table and
broke it. (Tr., p.133, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Brock clearly remembered her throwing the haymaker at
him, but did not remember much at all after the punch. (See Tr., pp.134, L.25 – p.135, L.5.) He
remembered hearing the glass breaking on the table. (See Tr., p.135, Ls.6-7.) The first thing
Mr. Brock remembered after being punched was calling 911. (Tr., p.135, Ls.11-13.)
In contrast, Ms. Brock testified that the physical altercation began when Mr. Brock struck
her with a closed fist on her head. (See Tr., p.35, Ls.15-24.) She told him to stop, and he then
struck her in the nose. (See Tr., p.36, L.7 – p.37, L.4.) She testified that when he struck her in
the nose, she heard and felt a crack and crunch, and she started to bleed. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.5-8.)
Per Ms. Brock, Mr. Brock hit her twice more, in the temple and jaw. (Tr., p.37, Ls.18-24.) She
then hit him in the left temple with a closed fist, and he fell and broke a table. (Tr., p.37, L.24 –
p.38, L.11.) However, Mr. Brock testified that he did not remember hitting, striking or punching
Ms. Brock. (Tr., p.136, Ls.2-4.)
Ms. Brock testified that, after she punched Mr. Brock, she grabbed his phone and went
into the bathroom. (See Tr., p.39, Ls.9-12.) She testified that he kicked in the door or pushed it
through, and she ran to the neighbors and asked them to call the police. (See Tr., p.39, L.15 –
p.40, L.9.) Ms. Brock testified that Mr. Brock went outside and told her no one was coming to
help her, but he denied chasing after her. (See Tr., p.39, L.22 – p.40, L.3, p.136, Ls.14-22.)
According to Ms. Brock, she told the police at the scene that she hit back. (See Tr., p.40,
L.21 – p.41, L.2.) Mr. Brock testified that he remembered talking to the police at the scene, but
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he was confused by Deputy Curl’s questions and still had “cobwebs” from being knocked out.
(See Tr., p.136, L.24 – p.137, L.22; see also State’s Ex. 2 (Deputy Curl’s redacted body camera
footage).) For example, he told the deputy he had been knocked out, but a few moments later
said he had not been knocked out, before he again stating he had been knocked out. (See
Tr., p.137, Ls.13-18.) He testified that he told Deputy Curl that he had not been drinking,
because he was not supposed to be drinking with his medication. (Tr., p.138, Ls.4-11.) He did
not know where she hit him on the head, because he did not see it coming. (Tr., p.138, Ls.1621.) Further, when asked why he denied hitting Ms. Brock, he answered, “I denied hitting her
because I didn’t hit her.” (Tr., p.139, Ls.7-10.) He did not actually remember hitting her at all at
any time that night. (Tr., p.139, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Brock also testified that he told the paramedics
at the scene that he had been knocked out. (See Tr., p.139, L.21 – p.140, L.3.)
Ms. Brock testified that she had an X-ray and CT tests at the hospital. (Tr., p.41, Ls.612.) She had follow-up care, and was continuing treatment for her injuries. (See Tr., p.41, L.13
– p.42, L.1.) A paramedic who had been at the scene testified that he believed that Ms. Brock
needed further medical attention, because of the swelling and possible internal injuries. (See
Tr., p.86, Ls.1-12.) The paramedics took Ms. Brock to the hospital. (See Tr., p.86, Ls.13-14.)
However, the paramedic could not make medical diagnoses. (Tr., p.85, Ls.23-25.)
The State charged Mr. Brock by Information with felony domestic battery—traumatic
injury. (R., pp.19-20.) He entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.21.)
Mr. Brock exercised his right to a jury trial. (See R., pp.45-46, 52-54.) Before opening
statements, Mr. Brock’s counsel informed the district court that he had “noticed on the State’s
witness list that they haven’t included a doctor. A doctor made a diagnosis of the injuries.” (See
Tr., p.19, Ls.7-10.) Defense counsel asserted, “Because that doctor is not testifying, I would like
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to make an oral motion in limine to prevent anyone from making any statements about what that
doctor’s diagnosis was.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.10-13.) Defense counsel explained: “The reason is
because none of us are medical experts. The only person that could really testify about that
diagnosis would be the doctor who made the diagnosis himself.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-17.)
The State argued that Ms. Brock could testify that she was receiving treatment for a
fractured nose. (See Tr., p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.14.) In reply, Mr. Brock’s counsel asserted that
Ms. Brock “is not a medical expert,” and she had no independent knowledge of a fractured nose
diagnosis. (See Tr., p.20, Ls.18-23.) While Ms. Brock could describe what she previously
experienced, defense counsel asserted that anything along the line of “fractured nose” was “all
based on someone else’s diagnosis and that is hearsay and there is at this point no exception to
that for that type of testimony.” (See Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.6.)
The district court ruled: “I think she can testify that she felt—heard a crack. My nose is
displaced. I don’t know if that’s the situation. Started bleeding profusely and to this date, I’m
being treated for the injuries that I suffered on my nose.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.18-22.)
However, during Ms. Brock’s direct examination, when the State asked her what
happened after she told Mr. Brock to stop, she testified: “He broke my nose. I heard a crack in
my nose.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10.) Defense counsel and the State both asked to approach, but the
district court instructed the jury, “I’ll ask that you ignore that answer and if you could reask the
question.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.11-16.)
Moreover, during Ms. Brock’s cross-examination, she testified that Mr. Brock was righthanded. (See Tr., p.43, Ls.8-9.) When Mr. Brock’s counsel asked her why she had testified at
the preliminary hearing that she did not know if Mr. Brock was right-handed or left-handed, she
responded that she did not remember at the time. (See Tr., p.43, L.10 – p.44, L.8.) Defense
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counsel then asked her, “Is it possible there’s other things that you don’t remember about that
night?” (Tr., p.44, Ls.18-19.) Ms. Brock replied: “It could be a possibility. I had a concussion
after that and that’s what happens.” (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-21.)
Mr. Brock’s counsel asked to approach off the record. (Tr., p.44, Ls.22-24.) After a
bench discussion, the district court instructed the jury: “Folks, I’m going to ask you to ignore the
last question. The last answer to the last question. Okay. Let’s move on.” (Tr., p.44, L.25 –
p.45, L.3.) Before redirect examination, the prosecutor told the district court with respect to
Ms. Brock, “I’m going to step out in the hallway and wait for her and admonish her again about
the diagnosis thing because I don’t want her to talk about it.” (Tr., p.60, Ls.1-6.)
As part of the final jury instructions, the district court instructed the jury:
The person who commits what would otherwise be a criminal act without being
conscious of committing the act is not guilty of the crime. Evidence has been
received which may tend to show the defendant was not conscious of committing
the act for which the defendant is here on trial. If after consideration of all the
evidence you have a reasonable doubt the defendant was conscious of committing
the act at the time the alleged crime was committed, the defendant must be found
not guilty. A person cannot rely upon unconsciousness as a defense if the
unconsciousness was a result of a person’s voluntary intoxication.
(Tr., p.209, Ls.4-14.)
In closing arguments, Mr. Brock’s counsel asserted that the issue was not so much
whether Mr. Brock caused Ms. Brock’s injuries, “but the issue is did he cause them as a
conscious act or did he cause them because he was unconscious?” (See Tr., p.223, Ls.6-9.)
Defense counsel asserted: “What I’m here to try and persuade you is that he was unconscious
when whatever happened between him and Mrs. Brock. I mean the actual physical touching,
whatever that was, he was unconscious.” (Tr., p.223, Ls.10-13.) The jury found Mr. Brock
guilty of domestic battery—traumatic injury. (R., pp.48-49; Tr., p.248, Ls.19-24.)
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Two weeks after the jury verdict, Mr. Brock filed a Motion for New Trial and Notice of
Hearing, “pursuant to ICR 34.” (R., pp.55-58.) The motion asserted: “During the jury trial in
this matter defense counsel made a Motion in Limine requesting that the Court prohibit witnesses
from presenting any medical diagnosis during the jury trial. The Court granted the Motion in
Limine.” (R., p.55.) Further: “During direct examination of the alleged victim in this matter, she
stated that Defendant had broken her nose. Defendant’s counsel attempted to move for a mistrial
at that time. (R., pp.55-56.) “However, the Court, without a hearing outside the presence of the
jury, decided to give a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider the broken nose
statement by the witness.” (R., p.56.) The motion also asserted: “During cross-examination of
the alleged victim, she stated that she suffered a concussion.

She presented this medical

diagnosis without solicitation by defense counsel. Before the issue of a mistrial could be raised,
immediately the Court once again gave an instruction to the jury to disregard that statement by
the witness.” (R., p.56.)
The motion then asserted that, “At the conclusion of closing statements defendant’s
counsel intended to move for a mistrial due to the aforementioned improprieties,” as well as the
district court’s separate decision to give a modified jury instruction on the unconscious act
defense. (See R., p.56.) “However, defendant’s counsel simply forgot to make that oral motion
prior to the jury’s verdict.” (R., p.56.) The motion asserted: “The two medical diagnosis
statements made by the alleged victim were separately, and collectively, enough to justify a
mistrial. Although the Court gave a corrective instruction, it is simply impossible for a jury to
ignore and/or forget such critical statements that certainly had the effect of inflaming the jury.”
(R., p.56.)
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At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Mr. Brock’s counsel explained, “The
problem I think, Your Honor, is that you cannot unring the bell.” (Tr., p.256, Ls.6-7.) Per
defense counsel, “Once they’ve heard that, even if they don’t necessarily discuss it during jury
deliberations, it has an effect on them,” where the jurors “now know that she had a broken nose
and had a concussion and it’s going to be much more difficult for a jury to believe the
unconscious act defense”, which was “the defense in this particular case.” (Tr., p.256, Ls.7-13.)
Thus, defense counsel believed that the district court should have declared a mistrial, “If not after
the first time, the second that she violated your motion—your order in limine that that should
have occurred.” (Tr., p.256, Ls.14-17.)
The district court stated, “So both of these motions are discretionary.” (Tr., p.263, Ls.78.)

The district court then determined: “On the medical testimony, I did give a curative

instruction to the jury to disregard the victim’s medical testimony in both cases, the broken nose
and the concussion, and I think the jury can reach the same results of a conviction without regard
to that. We gave an instruction on definition of traumatic injury.” (Tr., p.263, Ls.8-13.) The
district court determined: “These are discretionary. I have the curative instruction. I think that
took care of it.” (Tr., p.263, Ls.14-15.) The district court also rejected Mr. Brock’s assertions
regarding the modified jury instruction. (See Tr., p.263, L.16 – p.264, L.7.) Thus, the district
court denied the motion for a new trial. (Tr., p.264, L.8.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed,
suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Brock on supervised probation for a period of five years.
(R., pp.67-70.) Mr. Brock filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction, Order of Probation. (R., pp.74-77.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brock’s motion for a mistrial?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Brock’s Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Brock asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

for a new trial, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards. During the course of the trial, the district court erred in the decisions to not allow
Mr. Brock to request a mistrial, and to not declare a mistrial. When viewed in the context of the
full record, Ms. Brock’s medical diagnosis statements constituted reversible error. Thus, the
district court should have allowed Mr. Brock to request a mistrial, and then declared a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial on

any ground permitted by statute.” I.C.R. 34(a). The statutory grounds for granting a new trial
include, “When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision
of any question of law arising during the course of the trial.” I.C. § 19-2406(5).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “This Court reviews a denial of a motion for new
trial for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72 (2011). When an appellate
court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the sequence of inquiry requires
consideration of whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). “Because a motion for new trial
involves mixed questions of law and fact, an abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court’s
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findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly
apply the law.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 72 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Denied The Motion For A New Trial, Because The Court Erred In The Trial Decisions
To Not Allow Mr. Brock To Request A Mistrial, And To Not Declare A Mistrial
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Brock’s motion for a new trial,

because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. During the
course of the trial, the district court erred in the decisions to not allow Mr. Brock to request a
mistrial, and to not declare a mistrial.
“A mistrial may be declared on motion of the defendant when there occurs during the
trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R.
29.1(a).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion
for mistrial in a criminal case, the question is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.” State v.
Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912
(2003). “Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.” Id. “Thus,
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard
is a misnomer.” Id. “The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.” Id. The
appellate court’s “focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered
the mistrial motion.” Id. “The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if
that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.” Id.
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When viewed in the context of the full record here, the medical diagnosis statements by
Ms. Brock represented reversible error. Defense counsel noted that the State had not included
the doctor who diagnosed Ms. Brock’s injuries on its list of witnesses. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.7-10.)
Thus, Mr. Brock’s counsel made a motion in limine “to prevent anyone from making any
statements about what that doctor’s diagnosis was.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.10-13.) The district court
allowed Ms. Brock to “testify that she felt—heard a crack. My nose is displaced. I don’t know
if that’s the situation. Started bleeding profusely and to this date, I’m being treated for the
injuries that I suffered on my nose.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.18-22.)
However, Ms. Brock violated the district court’s order on Mr. Brock’s motion in limine
twice, by testifying on direct examination that Mr. Brock “broke my nose,” and by testifying on
cross-examination that she “had a concussion.” (See Tr., p.36, Ls.9-10, p.44, Ls.16-21.) Those
medical diagnosis statements were outside the scope of the permitted testimony under the district
court’s order on the motion in limine. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.18-22.) Moreover, Ms. Brock did not
qualify as an expert witness, meaning the medical diagnosis statements were inadmissible as
opinion testimony by a lay witness. See I.R.E. 701(c) & 702.
The medical diagnosis statements had a continuing impact on Mr. Brock’s trial. As
Mr. Brock’s counsel asserted before the district court, “Although the Court gave a corrective
instruction, it is simply impossible for a jury to ignore and/or forget such critical statements that
certainly had the effect of inflaming the jury.” (See R., p.56.) With the medical diagnosis
statements, the problem was “that you cannot unring the bell.” (See Tr., p.256, Ls.6-7.) As
defense counsel asserted, “Once they’ve heard that, even if they don’t necessarily discuss it
during jury deliberations, it has an effect on them,” where the jurors “now know that she had a
broken nose and had a concussion and it’s going to be much more difficult for a jury to believe
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the unconscious act defense”, which was “the defense in this particular case.” (See Tr., p.256,
Ls.7-13.) The State implicitly recognized the prejudice, considering the prosecutor admonished
Ms. Brock about the district court’s order after she made the two impermissible medical
diagnosis statements. (See Tr., p.60, Ls.1-6.)
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “A party’s deliberate violation of an order
excluding evidence with little relevance but with great potential for prejudice is an attack on the
fairness of the proceeding and cannot be countenanced.” State v. Herrera, 159 Idaho 615, 624
(2015). The facts of this case are in some ways distinguishable from Herrera, in that the order in
Herrera excluded other acts evidence. See id. Also, while the State in Herrera “asked questions
that appeared to be deliberately designed to elicit the exact testimony that the district court had
specifically prohibited,” see id., the State here merely asked Ms. Brock what happened after she
told Mr. Brock to stop before she gave the first medical diagnosis statement (see Tr., p.36, Ls.710).

But Ms. Brock made the second medical diagnosis statement after the district court

instructed the jury to disregard the first statement. (See Tr., p.36, Ls.11-16, p.44, Ls.20-21.) As
she was the State’s key witness, Ms. Brock’s two violations of the district court’s order on the
motion in limine should be imputed to the State. Cf. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67 (“As an officer
of the State, Trooper Daly’s gratuitous and prejudicial response is imputed to the State, whether
or not the State intended to elicit that response.”). Her violations were “an attack on the fairness
of the proceeding and cannot be countenanced.” See Herrera, 159 Idaho at 624.
The district court instructed the jury to disregard Ms. Brock’s medical diagnosis
statements. (See Tr., p.36, Ls.11-16, p.44, L.25 – p.45, L.3.) “Error in admission of evidence
may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s
direction.” Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421. However, the presumption that the jury will follow the
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jury instructions may be overcome. See, e.g., State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978); State v.
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2012). “[T]here are some contexts in which the risk
that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored.” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). Mr. Brock submits that, in this
context, the medical diagnosis statements overcame the presumption, because the continuing
impact of the statements and their prejudice to Mr. Brock’s unconscious act defense drastically
raised the risk that the jury would not follow the curative instructions.
Thus, when viewed in the context of the full record, Ms. Brock’s medical diagnosis
statements constituted reversible error. See Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421. The district court should
have allowed Mr. Brock to request a mistrial, and then declared a mistrial. See I.C.R. 29.1.
During the course of the trial, the district court erred in the decisions to not allow
Mr. Brock to request a mistrial, and to not declare a mistrial. The district court therefore abused
its discretion when it denied Mr. Brock’s motion for a new trial, because the district court did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See I.C. § 19-2406(5); I.C.R. 34(a). Thus,
this Court should vacate the order denying Mr. Brock’s motion for a new trial and the judgment
of conviction, and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Brock respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s order denying his motion for a new trial and his judgment of conviction, and remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2020.
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